Jaime Reyes - Wikipedia
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For example: toys for children below 3 years old that contain small detachable parts present the risk of choking and may provoke fatal accidents; professional machineries with unprotected cutting parts may provoke cuts or other serious injuries or even death to workers; mobile phones exploding can provoke injury or death to one or more people and damages of different degrees to properties cars, houses, planes ; a faulty meter at petrol pumps may imply economic losses for either the pump manager or the purchasers; energy-using products e.
Roughly half of them consider the effect as respectively "significant" or "moderate" see Figure 8. The competitive advantage enjoyed by rogue traders can be significant since ensuring products made available are compliant implies necessary costs. Operators who manufacture or distribute non-compliant products do not incur all these costs and thus enjoy significant savings that will be reflected in the final price of their products, hence distorting competition and causing possible loss of market-share by compliant companies.
The price differential at stake, putting compliant firms at a disadvantage, cannot be calculated for product sectors or the market as a whole. The problem of non-compliant products is not expected to go away in the foreseeable future if no action is taken. Due to the underlying variation in sectors and the multiple interlinked factors that lead to non-compliance, an extrapolation from these data or robust conclusions on trends in non-compliance rates are more difficult to project.
Although it cannot be excluded that more findings of non-compliance are the results of authorities' increasing efforts, one can reasonably assume that non-compliance will persist and probably continue to increase, especially in areas where product testing is expensive or where in-house laboratories are not available:.
The trend of increasing figures of non-compliance was also confirmed by the national reports, in particular with respect to eco-design and energy labelling and in the pyrotechnics sector:. Table 5: MSAs' Findings of non-compliance Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in the figures show some development which could mean that values of trade could increase in the future. Informal cooperation among authorities has been exploited to a large extent, however it has reached its limits and has proven insufficient to address the problem of surveillance of the Single Market.
Resources for market surveillance have decreased since and are unlikely to substantially increase in most Member States. In addition, technological change, increasing complexity of product and innovation in both product design and service delivery are changing the relationship between products and services that are part of the same value chain, and constitute new challenges for all actors in the supply chain and market surveillance authorities. The ongoing Digital Single Gateway intitiative will contribute to facilitate access to information on applicable EU rules already provided on Commission webpages, as it will be found more easily by businesses browsing on national websites.
However the initiative will not address the need to set up additional support infrastructure in this domain. These factors will have an increasingly negative impact on the effectiveness of market surveillance activities carried out by national authorities and the probability of detection of non-compliant products.
Consequently businesses' incentives to comply are expected to decrease further overtime and non-complaince increase.
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This impact assessment builds on two separate evaluations. The general conclusions are reported here.
Where relevant more detailed conclusions and findings are referred to in the different sections of this impact assessment report:. The first is the evaluation of Union harmonisation legislation of As regards market surveillance, it pointed to the importance of coordination mechanisms, the lack of uniformity in approach to market surveillance across EU28 and differing levels of resources and technical capacity This evaluation recommended to expand information and advice to businesses, and to ensure a faster transition to e-market surveillance with more use of digital means to demonstrate compliance and communicate with market surveillance authorities.
Its mains conclusions are as follows:. Effectiveness : Coordination and cooperation mechanisms have significantly developed, and are recognised as useful, but they have not reached a level that can be considered satisfactory, especially to trigger more effective cross-border enforcement among Member States and achieve more uniform and rigorous market surveillance throughout the Single Market.
The evaluation concluded that the Regulation is not fully effective in this regard. Efficiency : The efficiency of the Regulation has been assessed in terms of costs incurred by different stakeholders, benefits produced, and the extent to which desired effects results and impacts have been achieved at a reasonable cost. Important gaps and poor quality of data in the national reports hampered the assessment, which would need to be addressed in improvements of the reporting and monitoring mechanisms.
Coherence : Differences in definitions and terminology in some sectoral product legislation were noted and sometimes unclear boundaries with the General Product Safety Directive external coherence. While these issues may cause some uncertainties in the Regulation's application, they do not significantly hinder its implementation.
EU added value : While the potential is not fully reached, the evaluation confirms the added-value per se of a horizontal framework for market surveillance of harmonised products manufactured within the EU and imported from 3 rd countries, in addition to sector specific legislation. Moreover the evaluation identified certain areas where regulatory burdens could be minimised and rules could be simplified, often as part of a wider problem or weakness of the current Regulation Specific administrative simplifications are highlighted in the impact assessment section of this report.
This impact assessment covers the particular issue of the scope of investigative and enforcement powers of market surveillance authorities to cover new players in global and e-commerce supply chains see section 1. Coordination mechanisms within Member States should be improved and simplified;. The problem of insufficiencies in the control system and lacking deterrent tools is set out in 1.
Option 3 b EU Product compliance network would improve cross-border coordination; Options 2 a effective mutual assistance requests and 3 a transferability of enforcement evidence and decisions provide for improvement in cooperation tools. Option 2 b member state enforcement strategies aims to improve the programming and reporting of the current Regulation. The single market for products is a key achievement of the European Union.
Yet, the elimination of national barriers for industrial products offered plenty of opportunities to less scrupulous traders who do not apply the Union harmonisation legislation. The EU has therefore the right to act on the basis of Article TFEU, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the single market for industrial products and to increase the efficiency of cross-border market surveillance. The first stipulates that a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities, the latter provides that in order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall, amongst others, contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers.
Despite the existence of the single EU market, the enforcement of Union harmonisation legislation is the Member States' competence. The proper implementation of the principle of subsidiarity therefore requires that the procedures and actions against concrete products posing risks are carried out by Member States. However, as a matter of fact, the enforcement of Union harmonisation legislation within the single market creates major challenges for public authorities whose action is constrained by their jurisdictional boundaries, while many undertakings implement their business models in several Member States or at the EU level.
To increase the level of compliance on the market, every Member State depends on the market surveillance of its neighbours. Consequently, weaknesses in the organisation of market surveillance in one single Member State can seriously undermine the efforts taken by other Member States to keep non-compliant products from the market; this creates a weak link in the chain.
This interdependence is reinforced by the fact that the competence of market surveillance authorities is limited to the national territory. Where action is needed in other jurisdictions, authorities must rely on their colleagues in other Member States. Therefore to ensure consistent enforcement of Union harmonisation legislation across the EU and to tackle efficiently non-compliance spanning over several Member States, it is necessary to coordinate public enforcement activities.
This needs to be achieved at the Union level. The general objective of this initiative is to improve the functioning of the Single Market by increasing compliance with EU product harmonisation legislation and, conversely, reducing the number of non-compliant products on the EU market.
In a single market where products move freely, compliance with EU legislation serves the protection of public interests consumers and workers' health, environment protection, etc. Stepping up compliance with EU product harmonisation legislation requires a holistic approach that aims at improving at the same time incentives to comply and effectiveness of market surveillance.
Against this background, the specific objectives of this initiative are:. Reinforcing market surveillance cooperation procedures , reducing fragmentation and inefficiencies;. Increasing operational enforcement capacity , improving efficiency of market surveillance action, targeting of controls, and availability of resources;. Strengthening the enforcement toolbox , allowing market surveillance authorities to use more deterrent, effective and future proof tools;. Promoting compliance with EU legislation on non-food products, improving accessibility of compliance information. The objectives cover market surveillance within the EU and at the external borders and encompass digital and traditional supply chains.
Similarly, each objective pursues simplification and possibilities to reduce administrative burden where relevant. The Commission recognised the essential role of enforcement networks and set out to encourage and help Member States to improve their capacity to enforce EU law and make sure that administrative authorities and inspectorates are sufficiently and adequately equipped to perform their tasks Furthermore, the Commission put forward a proposal for the reform of the Consumer Protection Cooperation CPC Regulation , which governs the powers of enforcement authorities and the manner in which they can cooperate.
In addition, the Commission proposed new rules to enable Member States' competition authorities to be more effective enforcers of EU antitrust rules The proposal seeks to make sure they have all the tools they require to achieve this. It is intended to further empower the Member States' competition authorities. Stronger enforcement powers are also a key issue in other recent legislative initiatives and data protection laws and recent legislative developments in the field of fertilisers With increasing product imports yet declining resources for customs, the Customs Union's governance would need to be better geared to current and future challenges.
The policy options take into account the advocated coordination and inter-agency cooperation mechanisms, enhanced risk assessments including at the level of the Customs Union to make controls more efficient and effective Regarding global trade, the Commission reaffirmed its policy based on openness and cooperation. However to combat situations where rules exist but are not respected, the EU would need to have the instruments at its disposal to restore a level playing field and act decisively against countries or companies that engage in unfair practices.
Strong enforcement of EU rules would also ensure that all companies present or active in the EU which break the rules are effectively sanctioned, in cooperation with Member State authorities and strengthened EU customs risk management in order to facilitate and accelerate legitimate EU trade, while ensuring the safety and security of citizens by stopping fake or dangerous goods permeating EU borders The consistency with the Charter for fundamental rights is considered in the assessment of the options.
Figure Policy objectives and options to achieve them. In order to address the problems identified in section 3 and its underlying drivers, a number of policy options have been identified. These options include a baseline scenario and a series of measures that are presented from the lightest to more far-reaching means to tackle the drivers of the problem and reduce the number of non-compliant products in the single market.
A detailed description of the measures in each option is provided in sections 4.
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While the options are grouped by increasing ambition and EU coordination, no transfer of powers to the EU away from Member States are considered. Options that would profoundly change the balance of competence on national versus EU level have been discarded as follows:. However the evidence gathered did not find clearly that one organisational set-up e. Furthermore, certain differences in the distribution of competences at national level are closely linked to national administrative and legal systems of a given Member State.
Measures to harmonise national enforcement systems would be disproportionate and the profound changes to national administrative and legal systems would be hard to justify from a subsidiarity point of view. EU inspectorate , to perform market surveillance and take enforcement decisions instead of national authorities for all or certain product categories : The high number of economic operators and products would require the capacity to conduct inspections and a presence on the terrain throughout the EU and at entry points for goods into the EU.
The investigation of certain wide-spread cases will be considered in option 4. The baseline scenario is the "no policy change" option. This option would involve a modest revision of the market surveillance framework, building on existing legal provisions and formalising current ad-hoc cooperation mechanisms. These additions would address some of the shortcomings identified by the evaluation of the implementation of the current market surveillance rules.
The cooperation procedures would be particularly relevant to target enforcement action upstream in the supply chain, at importers or manufacturers. The measure would also address procedural issues to ensure an efficient flow of the mutual assistance requests between authorities e.
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This would facilitate the actual use of the principle of cooperation that, as shown by the evaluation, is currently underexploited. This measure would entail a modification and streamlining of the existing requirements on Member States to report control programmes and evaluations of their market surveillance activities and a clearer specification of principles of risks assessment that could be used to select and target controls. The enforcement strategies would in particular contain an assessment of compliance and capacity gaps, priority areas and actions to address these gaps and monitoring.
To support the implementation of the strategies and capacity building in Member States, the financing provisions would cover the strategies within the limits of current multi-annual financial framework, up to ; a future expansion of funding could build on the strategies as a tool to access EU co-funding, but is as such not part of this impact assessment This would contribute to address the problem of lack of resources for controls identified by the evaluation Based on the national strategies, indicators and benchmarks would be built to compare information across Member States and to facilitate monitoring These measures would address the difficulties highlighted in the evaluation as regards the implementation of the current provisions on market surveillance programmes and reports on activities carried out.
The powers would span the full supply chain, including traders or intermediaries that could be relevant to the investigation With developing e-commerce, the toolbox of authorities should also more explicitly include powers relevant to digital supply chains, such as investigative powers in relation to internet traders, performance of on-line test-purchases or, ultimately, enforcement powers to require removal of on-line content related to non-compliant products Besides investigative and enforcement powers that authorities must have as a minimum, market surveillance authorities would also have more flexible, collaborative and optional enforcement tools to gather market intelligence and prevent non-compliance e.
A clearer and explicit common toolbox would help market surveillance authorities to cooperate more efficiently which each other and participate in joint actions on similar grounds e. These PCPs could be tasked to also respond to information requests from businesses on harmonised EU product rules. Typical needs for tailor-made information or advice would be which EU product legislation applies to the businesses' product s and how several requirements could interact if more legislative acts apply to one product e. A better understanding of whether and how legal requirements would apply to their products would allow businesses to factor these in into their operations, prevent non-compliance and alleviate the need for possible corrective measures by market surveillance authorities.
This new portal would allow businesses to communicate to the EU-wide public any voluntary measures they undertake to withdraw or recall unsafe, non-compliant products. Such a web-portal would help businesses to inform consumers and could assist also in reaching traders in complex decentralised distribution chains, local shops or e-commerce intermediaries. The use of the portal would be optional and would not alter the economic operators' existing underlying obligations to take corrective measures and to inform Member States authorities about such measures Variants of the measures considered but discarded at early stage and not further assessed in detail :.
This option would involve important additions to the market surveillance framework, expanding existing provisions and adding coordination structures for enforcement cooperation, building on option 2. These additions would address most of the shortcomings identified by the evaluation of the current market surveillance rules. This measure would add provisions in the market surveillance framework to facilitate re-use of evidence, test-reports and decisions of one market surveillance authority for use in and by authorities in other Member States.
This measure would add legal principles in the market surveillance framework to ensure the portability of test results , a presumption that products found to be non-compliant in Member State A are also non-compliant in Member State B, and similarly in the area of control of imports, that confirmed non-compliances by market surveillance controls leading to customs' refusal to the release a product for free circulation are communicated and also refused in other Member States The legal principles would clarify in particular that market surveillance authorities can issue restrictive measures directly to economic operators in other Member State s — e.
These measures would help reducing the inefficiency in controls and ambiguity on the jurisdiction of authorities due to the current fragmentation of market surveillance competences in the Single Market identified by the evaluation In this option the Network would pool resources, intelligence and expertise and coordinate Member States' investigative and enforcement activities, based on decisions by the Member States in the network on common priority topics to take forward.
The Network would not undertake investigations of its own or take any enforcement decisions. The Network would not modify, replace or in any way supersede the responsibilities for market surveillance that remain the competence of Member States. The Network would be composed of:. It would define the priorities for common market surveillance actions and monitor the implementation of the Network's work programme, coordinate and steer the administrative coordination group's activity These groups would set-up and coordinate common market surveillance control campaigns, ensure coordinated application of product legislation, develop common practices, methodologies, identify issues of shared interest and suggest common approaches on these.
For this measure the impact assessment considers different variants of size Secretariat's human and financial resources to modulate the resources input and relate these to the anticipated increased operational actions that the network could achieve. The set-up of the Network would allow structured dialogue and cooperation among authorities in different countries favouring the building of a common approach on a number of common issues. The tasks of the network would include peer reviews of market surveillance authorities, to monitor market surveillance efforts and effects across the Single Market based on the Member State information and indicators further to measures f and g in option 2.
Such businesses i. To reinforce the deterrent effect of enforcement decisions, market surveillance authorities would be required, firstly, to publish more systematically restrictive measures they take against non-compliant products. This measure would add onto the existing obligations of market surveillance authorities to share i nformation on restrictive measures with authorities in other member states and with the Commission , to communicate m easures concerning products presenting a serious risk through the Rapid Alert system RAPEX also published on the Commission's website and to alert users in their territories The legal powers for costs recovery as a matter of principle are already available in a majority of Member States but not necessarily applied.
A similar tool has been operational for many years in the area of food controls and it would align powers of market surveillance in this respect with cost recovery options available to customs In cases of suspected non-compliance , market surveillance authorities could also order an economic operator to provide evidence e.
All these measures would contribute to address the problem of insufficient deterrence of current control systems as identified in the evaluation. The publication obligation would be limited to non-sensitive information, in particular the Declaration of Conformity The economic operators concerned are already required to draw up the declaration and to make it available to other economic operators in their supply chain and to market surveillance authorities on request.
This measure would add a pro-active publication via digital means so that easier and widespread accessibility could be ensured. This option would involve a significant modification of the market surveillance framework, by adding for certain enforcement tools or infringements EU level measures and actions, building on option 3. These modifications would also address additional shortcomings identified by the evaluation of the current market surveillance rules.
Reinforcing cooperation procedures. EU law would allow the direct enforceability of restrictive measures taken by a market surveillance authority in one Member State, to all other Member States wherever the same non-compliant product would occur. This measure would extent a national restrictive measure banning a non-compliant product from its national market, to a ban throughout the EU and for any further imports of the same product This measure would involve extending the available mechanisms by which authorities and the Commission currently notify each other and scrutinise restrictive measures with a cross-border aspect see safeguard clause mechanism, option 3 e above to cover also restrictive measures of a market surveillance authority for non-compliances that seem limited to the national territory at the moment of investigation.
Moreover, non-compliance of a product leading to a restrictive measure by market surveillance authorities also entails the right to remedies for the consumers and professional end-users who purchased such product. They could return a non-compliant product and request remedies from the economic operator from whom they bought the product. These remedies would apply the principles to situations of non-compliance Market surveillance authorities in all Member States would also be empowered to order an economic operator to provide remedies on a case-by-case basis to end-users An additional mandate to the EU Product Compliance Network option 3 f above to perform investigations and take enforcement decisions, in cases of widespread infringements This measure would introduce the possibility for the EU product compliance network structure to conduct an investigation and take an enforcement decision for widespread infringements with significant impact on a large part of the EU territory.
The opening of such an investigation would be subject to the agreement of the Commission and Member States, who would decide on the network's priorities and such EU level investigations and decisions. This measure would define in the legal framework categories of non-compliance e. The measure would complement the current legislative framework which sets out a general obligation on Member States to provide for and apply 'effective, proportionate, and dissuasive' sanctions, including criminal sanctions for serious infringements and possible increased penalties for repeat offenses In some cases the product legislation adds general additional principles to take into account e.
This measure would address the problem of low deterrence of the current system of penalties identified in the evaluation as a consequence of divergences in national sanctioning rules. The information would concern both sensitive technical documentation as well as non-sensitive information. This measure would involve a centrally managed database, by the Commission, and require economic operators to upload and keep up to date all the relevant technical compliance documentation. Access to the information would be separated into a public part declaration of conformity, measure a option 3 above and a non-public part for commercially sensitive technical documentation which would be easily but securely accessible for market surveillance authorities and the Commission The impacts are described in section 1.
Thanks to the formalised mutual assistance mechanism in this option, the exchange of cases between Member States would become smoother, with faster responses, as there will be clearer common principles for the assistance requests and deadlines Overall, it should allow reducing the rate of authorities that would never or rarely be able to follow-up on restrictive measures of other Member States, and lead to more regular effective help to the requesting authority When market surveillance authorities work on the basis of a common toolbox, exchanging cases and responding to assistance requests from other countries will become easier measure d in this option.
The challenge for the receiving authorities will be to mobilise resources quickly to respond to the incoming requests. Possible difficulties, for instance linked to acceptance of findings or test carried out in another Member State, are not addressed in this option. These barriers remain. The combination of the mutual assistance and the implementation of certain enforcement powers and tools system audits, compliance programmes with large manufacturers and importers would allow over time important efficiency gains see measures e and f in this option.
The compliance and enforcement gaps assessment would help Member States to identify opportunities for increased cooperation between market surveillance authorities and with customs e. However this option in itself would not make significantly more resources available for market surveillance authorities or help to overcome the resources constraints that currently hamper them to carry out more inspections, perform product testing or participate in more coordinated cross-border control campaigns or invest in IT-tools.
By better enforcement intelligence, controls could be better targeted. The existing resources would then be used more efficiently but this option would be unlikely to trigger a noticeable increase in actual control activity. In the baseline an average Member States already have the envisaged powers in a majority or some sectors in Member States market surveillance authorities have the powers in over 14 of 33 product sectors; a further Member States in some product sectors In the future these powers will be commonly available to all market surveillance authorities across Member States and sectors, thus guaranteeing an equivalent enforcement toolbox and the possibility for authorities to intervene with the same powers in similar cases regardless of the location of the infringement.
Moreover, the powers to require information and cooperation from any trader, intermediaries and relevant natural or legal persons in the supply chain, and where necessary sanction absence of response would equip market surveillance authorities better for the frequent situations where the economic operator is located in a 3 rd country jurisdiction or difficult to trace or elusive e-commerce The availability of powers which are particularly relevant for e-commerce would also significantly improve mystery-shopping, requiring illegal content to be removed from websites, suspension of websites Availability of such powers directly to market surveillance authorities would allow them to react swiftly which is needed to be effective in the highly versatile e-commerce context.
As a result, more non-compliant or unsafe products offers could be removed from the internet faster. Ultimately the deterrent effect of a better toolbox would depend on the actual use. For instance, over time, a coherent and regular use across Member States of the power to sanction absence of responses or documentation could incentivise more businesses to comply. This option would incentivise Member States to develop more compliance schemes as part of their enforcement policy mix together with measures 2 b and 2 f. Businesses and market surveillance authorities could justify the cost they deploy for such tools through reduced inspection scope or frequency, and that compliance problems could be addressed efficiently, in a preventative manner instead of by costly corrective action This would be especially relevant in Member States where market surveillance is carried out at several levels national, regional and local.
Market surveillance authorities may however be cautious to engage in structural pro-active co-operation with sector organisations or fees-based assistance to businesses as it may blur the line with their role as independent inspectors e. While interesting as a source of intelligence, evidence of non-compliance brought forward by businesses, even based on recognised testing-standards, would in many Member States not be admissible as formal evidence in proceedings The Product Contact Points are available in all Member States, thus familiar with local chamber of commerce and associations and closer to smaller businesses that may have difficulties in easily accessing information or advice from EU centralised sources.
Distributors would similarly be better informed. Stakeholders' views on the option The effectiveness and the necessity of powers to act against non-compliant products even if the economic operator is not based in the EU are supported by business stakeholders and authorities. Member States market surveillance experts recognised that a common set of powers would help to facilitate cross-border cooperation and provide for an enforcement level-playing field across the EU.
While some specific powers would need to be used only as last resort e. Also other stakeholders generally agreed on the usefulness of comprehensive and up-to-date information on a single website. As explained in the evaluation most of the enforcement costs stemming from current market surveillance rules are borne by public authorities, while costs on businesses only relate to information obligations responding to requests from authorities, information on non-compliances detected and are therefore regarded as insignificant by them For this reason this section focuses on measures in this option that would result in specific benefits in terms of administrative simplifications for authorities.
The ability to apply investigative and enforcement powers across all relevant parties in the product supply chain, streamlining the applicable definitions, implies an important simplification for market surveillance authorities. They will be able to investigate, require cooperation and act where needed and where their action can be most effective. The flexibility to work across the supply chain would be a major improvement in legal empowerment and certainty for market surveillance authorities who in the current system are confronted with varying definitions and texts, in particular for e-commerce While online sales and market surveillance will increase, it is difficult to project the number of enforcement cases authorities would take on in future years and more in particular the specific proportion of infringement cases linked to new, additional economic players in the supply chain In the longer term Member States would also benefit from the opportunity to organise their market surveillance more flexibly, as the powers will be common, independent of specific sectors or legislation.
The market surveillance authority would avoid costs associated with the case-handling as well as economise on the reporting or on communicating information to others authorities and the Commission on individual cases. The realisation of these simplification benefits would however develop over time, depending on the uptake of the mutual assistance requests scheme, the use of powers including systems audits of large economic operators, and the implementation of enforcement strategies by Member States.
The common IT-tool ICSMS would be used for simpler and quicker notification of competent authorities and exchange information on planned controls. This could result in the short term in some reduction of administrative burden linked to the communication to the Commission of control programmes Most costs are linked to the planning and programming of controls. This part would remain, as it constitutes a necessary basis of enforcement strategies. For Member States, the strategy would become a strategic and information sharing tool, adding benefits over a mere reporting obligation.
The common powers for market surveillance authorities, procedures for mutual assistance between authorities, and enforcement strategies and performance indicators would be measures directed at and implemented by Member States authorities and would not entail new obligation or costs for businesses. The size of the costs would depend on the specific case and number of requests In most cases, the authorities receiving a mutual assistance request would only carry out ad hoc steps e.
In the baseline scenario, Member States are already required to follow up on other authorities' notifications; the mutual assistance request mechanism may lead to more requests being circulated among Member States. Depending on the nature of the request, this may imply more effort for market surveillance authorities, i. On balance the effort would however be off-set by efficiency gains that market surveillance authorities could obtain by receiving assistance for their own cases, and the reliance on systems audits on manufacturers and importers in the Member States where these are operators are established.
The use of 'enforcement strategies' would imply a shift in the contents of such programmes, rather than adding a new layer or reporting obligation Besides initial alignment costs to adapt to the new form of programmes estimated on average Austria jobs?? Belgium jobs?? Czechia jobs?? Denmark jobs?? France jobs?? Greece jobs?? Ireland jobs?? Italy jobs?? Netherlands jobs?? Spain jobs?? Russia jobs?? Israel jobs?? Turkey jobs?? Jobs System , October 6, October 6, , 0. Cornwall Council. The role holder will be required to provide support to the Licensing Team in our Bodmin office.
The role is 3 days a week on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. The role holder will be required to develop and implement effective administration and information systems in order to deliver a high quality service. The role holder will also be required, under supervision, to deal with applications and day to day technical enquiries from various stakeholders and manage their own workload.
Assistant Licensing Officer
In order to fulfil this role, the role holder will be expected to have knowledge of licensing and how it is applied in Cornwall Council. The Licensing Team is a very busy, customer focussed team with a high level of interaction with Members, businesses and other organisations. Please view the role profile; your application will need to explain how you may meet the stated criteria.
Cornwall Council is committed to safeguarding and is an equal opportunities employer. More information about working for Cornwall Council is available here. We require an enthusiastic and well motivated officer to undertake the role of Assistant Licensing Officer. In addition they must be able to work positively and collaboratively and plan work efficiently and effectively. Share this. Jobs System , October 5, October 5, , 0.
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